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Abstract
We study the role of performance di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1. Introduction
In today's societies, groups are often occupation specic. As such, they are congruent with
organizational structures, to exploit the benets from specialization and agglomeration. Groups
therefore tend to dier along performance-related dimensions, such as required skills, economic
returns from eort, and incentives for eort-based selection. Moreover, economic performance tends
to be correlated within naturally occurring groups, for instance, because of structural features of
local housing markets, determinants of migration, and the fact that learning and the spread of
information are bounded by groups. Such correlations imply that individuals are more similar
within than across groups, thereby contributing to the salience and comparability of performance
dierences between groups. Economists have long suspected that these factors shape performance
perceptions and subsequent decisions.1
In this study, we explore the role of performance dierences in a task requiring cognitive eort
in a laboratory experiment on in-group bias. In-group bias is dened as choosing in favor of in-
groups at the expense of out-groups (for a review, see Hewstone et al., 2002). There is a large and
rapidly emerging literature showing that group membership aects individual behavior in a wide
range of situations. However, existing results about in-group bias are often inconsistent across the
literature. Standardized eect sizes estimated from meta-studies are generally quite small, but the
numbers vary substantially conditional on the type of the study (see, Balliet et al., 2014; Lane,
2016).2
Our study supports this general impression and shows that in-group bias depends on both
subjects' own performance and on how they perceive the performance of other members of the in-
group, relative to an out-group. We show that cognitive ability aects in-group bias in performance-
based groups and in minimal groups. We measure the in-group bias by means of a non-strategic
allocation choice between in- and out-group members. Our most prominent result is that in-
group bias is strong in groups consisting of high-performing members, and weak in low-performing
groups. This result obtains even though high-performing subjects are not, on average, more or less
other-regarding than low-performing ones, i.e., the asymmetry eect shows up in terms of a higher
variance rather than a dierence in means. As a second result, we nd that high-performing subjects
exhibit no in-group bias as members of minimal groups, whereas low-performing subjects strongly
do. These two ndings show that the asymmetric bias between high- and low performing groups
dominates and overturns dierences at the individual level between how subjects react to being
categorized as members of random (minimal) groups. Finally, we explore whether the strength of a
social norm, as measured by norm enforcement, diers across treatments. We observe instances of
1See, for instance, Jackson (2011) on the study of networks generally from an economists perspective, Luttmer
(2005) on relative earnings between neighbors and well-being, and Alesina et al. (1999) on social fragmentation and
the provision of public goods. For theoretical arguments as to why beliefs might be endogenous to empirical levels of
performance, see Piketty (1998) and Alesina and Angeletos (2005).
2Balliet et al. (2014) and Lane (2016) report eect sizes between a quarter and a third of a standard deviation,
respectively. Restricting to observations nding a signicant bias, Lane (2016) reports an average eect size of two
thirds of a standard deviation.
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low-performing subjects punishing the in-group favoritism of low-performing peers. The same does
not occur in high-performing or minimal groups where subjects generally accept that decisions are
in-group biased. Together, these results suggest that perceived dierences in performance give rise
to an asymmetric deference relationship between groups.
In our design, we observe a simple choice between two allocations: the decision maker can
implement either an equal or unequal distribution of payos among three subjects including herself.
The unequal distribution pays more to the decision maker and another subject, however, at the
expense of a third subject. To measure the extent of in-group bias, in two conditions, A and B,
the design randomly varies which of the other subjects belongs to the same group as the decision
maker. In condition A, the materially self-interested choice inicts a loss on the in-group member.
Condition B is identical except that the self-interested choice hurts the out-group member. This
design provides a measure of in-group bias as the dierence in average behavior between conditions
A and B.
In the main treatments of the experiment, we assign subjects to either high- or low-performing
groups based on their scores on a cognitive ability test. Group assignment is common knowledge. As
a control, we implement minimal groups based on a criterion unrelated to performance. Therefore,
decision makers in the experiment can be members of any three \identity groups:" high, low, or
minimal. For each of these groups, we measure the in-group bias as the average treatment eect
between conditions A and B, thereby accounting for individual-specic unobserved factors along
with subjects' assignment to performance-based groups. Finally, we repeat the experiment among
the same subjects with the only dierence being that the formerly passive member of the same
identity group is given the opportunity to punish the decision maker.
We regard our ndings as important, as most natural groups dier with respect to income,
wealth, and educational achievements. Evidence from surveys illustrates that dierences in per-
formance due to work preferences and abilities are indeed highly salient in people's perceptions
(see Alesina and Giuliano, 2011). For example, Fiske et al. (2002) observe that Americans gener-
ally associate high group status with favorable traits, such as being competent or deserving, and
low group status with laziness or not being intelligent. Our paper contributes to understanding
possible consequences of perceived performance of groups. We thereby provide a fruitful synopsis
of two prominent, but so far largely separated lines of the literature, namely, research on social
identity and group status in social psychology, and the work on social preferences and entitlements
in economics (see section 2 for references and a thorough discussion of the literature).
Our results conrm the social identity approach in that we, as many others, already observe a
signicant in-group bias in minimal groups. The contribution of our paper is to show that group
performance inuences the in-group bias. Two consistent explanations are that (i) subjects derive
a stronger sense of membership in high-performing groups and that (ii) observable performance
dierences give rise to equity considerations between groups. These explanations likely hold si-
multaneously, and they are both valid for modeling asymmetric social norms in groups of dierent
performance.
Our favored explanation is that social identity matters, and that entitlement motives add to
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the in-group bias in high-performing groups, but work in the opposite direction in low-performing
groups. The underlying reason is that the members of low-performing groups view their peers as less
deserving than members of high performing groups. This interpretation implies that the members
of low-status groups implausibly perceive themselves as inferior, irrespective of how the dierence
in social status came about. Indirect support comes from evidence suggesting that a sense of
\consensual inferiority," amply observed among low-status groups, breaks down if status dierences
are perceived as illegitimate in the sense that they arise from factors beyond an individual's control
(see, for example, Ellemers et al. (1999), Bettencourt et al. (2001), and Levin et al. (2002); for a
more general overview of the research on legitimacy in psychology, see Tyler (2006)). Suggestive
evidence also comes from our experiment. In our design, the members of a low-performing group
know that the respective out-group member has worked hard in relation to the in-group. That
some of them punish their peers for being in-group biased is therefore consistent with a concern for
entitlements. We note, however, that the usual understanding of social status is often intertwined
with perception of entitlements.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we explain how our study relates
to the existing literature. In Section 3, we explain the experimental design and how we measure
in-group bias. In Section 4, we report the results, and Section 5 concludes and discusses further
implications of our study.
2. Further Literature
The literature on in-group bias in economics starts with Akerlof and Kranton (2000). Following
the social identity approach in social psychology (Tajfel and Turner, 1979; Turner et al., 1987),
these authors dene identity or self-image as derived from prescriptions of appropriate behavior
for dierent social categories or groups. In this model, people are reluctant to deviate from group-
specic norms, which implies that their behavior is biased toward the categories or groups to which
they belong. Most of the empirical research in economics focuses on this immediate implication of
the model and tests whether subjects exhibit dierent behaviors toward in- and out-group members,
as we do. This literature illustrates that decisions are in-group biased in a large class of games
(among others, see Hargreaves Heap and Varoufakis, 2002; Charness et al., 2007; Chen and Li,
2009). To mitigate systematic dierences in unobserved characteristics across groups, most studies
randomly assign subjects to articial minimal or near-to-minimal groups. In comparison to our
study, this literature does not focus on the asymmetry of in-group bias between subjects or groups
with dierent characteristics.
Literature on heterogeneity in in-group bias. In the economics literature, only a few papers
deal with the question of how in-group bias varies with the characteristics of individuals or groups.
Klor and Shayo (2010) study voting on redistribution among subjects from two distinct natural
groups. They nd pronounced group bias on the aggregate level, but this eect is driven by only
a third of subjects, who are classied as \social identiers." Further details of their study suggest
that social identiers are dierent outside the lab, too. In particular, Klor and Shayo (2010) nd
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from survey data that the correlation between income and redistributive preferences is weaker for
social identiers than for materially self-interested subjects.3 Kranton et al. (2016) use a within-
subject design to study group bias in a minimal-group and a political-group treatment. They nd
that about a third of subjects show no in-group bias in either treatment, and subjects who are
in-group biased in the minimal-group treatment are more likely to be biased in the political-group
treatment. They also observe that subjects who have no party aliation are least likely to be in-
group biased. In a companion study on M-Turk, Kranton and Sanders (2017) test for correlates of
individual propensities to treat people dierently. Although they nd no eect of demographics and
personality, their results suggest that subjects coming from regions that have experienced a drop
in economic performance are the most likely to be social identiers. These results conrm the need
to account for the possibility that subjects propensities to treat people dierently correlate with
individual performance, as we do in our study. Moreover, recent evidence provided by Benjamin
et al. (2013), Hoppe and Kusterer (2011), and Abeler and Marklein (2016) suggests that individuals
with low cognitive ability are more prone to behavioral biases in individual decision making. To
our knowledge, there is no study considering a correlation between cognitive ability and in-group
bias in minimal groups.4
The closest match to our paper that we are aware of is Hett et al. (2016). In an experiment
similar to Hargreaves Heap and Zizzo (2009), these authors measure the value of groups as subjects'
willingness to accept (WTA) being assigned to another group, as compared to staying in their
own group. While Hargreaves Heap and Zizzo (2009) use minimal groups to identify the pure
psychological benets of belonging to a group, Hett et al. (2016) assign subjects to \real" groups
that dier by whether they study at the same or a dierent university, and by whether their
performance in a summation task is high or low. Hett et al. (2016) nd that the stated WTAs are
highest in high-performing groups at a subjects' own university. Furthermore, they nd that the
WTAs are associated with in-group bias in a dictator game. Therefore, their results are similar
to ours, in that they also observe a high level of in-group bias in high-performing groups. There
are also important dierences between Hett et al. (2016) and our study, however. They focus on
measuring the preference for belonging to a group, and not so much on a general relation between
in-group bias and performance, and their design does not contain a minimal-group treatment to test
whether subjects of dierent performance dier with respect to a general bias toward an out-group
per se. Rather, in their design, every group is characterized by variation along two real dimensions
that are not necessarily orthogonal, and their subjects work on a joint quiz to enhance group
identity. Correlates of general biasedness and idiosyncratic inuences of groups may be dicult to
disentangle, because of these features of the design. In contrast, we aim to identify the eects of
performance dierences on in-group bias in the absence of any potentially intervening forces.
3Strong national identication among poor voters as observed from surveys, may then explain why they exhibit
lower-than-expected support for redistribution (see Shayo, 2009).
4There is, however, a literature focusing on individuals' performance in cognitive and social tasks as the outcome,
rather than the cause, of in-group biased behaviors. See, e.g., Schmader et al. (2008), for a study on the eects of
negative stereotyping.
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Social psychological literature on in-group bias and status. The literature in social psychology
denes social identity as a sense of self derived from membership of a group and the characteristics
shared with its members (Tajfel and Turner, 1979). Social identity theory assumes that the in-
group bias follows from a sequence consisting of social categorization (labelling someone as member
of a group), social identication (deriving a sense of self), and group comparison (deriving a higher
sense of self from favorable group comparison).5 With regard to the latter, an extensive body
of research from social psychology suggests that in-group bias is higher for high-status groups.
The term group status is thereby used broadly, as perceived dierences between groups on valued
dimensions of comparisons.6 A prominent strand of the literature considers group bias of ethnic
groups. This literature reports evidence in support of in-group bias of high-status majorities and
out-group favoritism of underprivileged minorities (for a review see Tajfel, 1982). However, and in
line with our study, these eects have been observed to depend on whether individuals accept status
dierentials as legitimate in the sense of being equitable and just (for meta analyses see Mullen
et al., 1992; Bettencourt et al., 2001). Although patterns of this kind would also have important
implications in the domain of economics, the literature has hitherto not dealt much with the role
of status dierences in in-group bias.7
The social psychology research on group status is closely related to our study in that group status
is often manipulated by assigning individuals to groups on the basis of performance in a task.8 It
diers from our research, however, both in terms of focus and methods. Social psychology focuses
on the study of ethnocentrism understood as a positive evaluation of the in-group relative to the
out-group. As a result, it is overwhelmingly focused on the study of stereotypes and prejudice, as
captured by self-reported, survey-based measures of perceived traits and evaluations. For example,
Mullen et al. (1992) in their meta-analysis only include studies that measure perceptions. When
it comes to studying discriminatory behavior, the prevailing method consists of so-called other-
other-allocations in which decision makers can transfer resources between in-group and out-group
members, at no cost to themselves. This method was pioneered by Tajfel (1970), to illustrate
that there is discrimination against an out-group \even if there is no reason for it in terms of
the individual's own interests." To the best of our knowledge, there is no controlled study on
5Self-categorization theory extends this approach by focusing on the interplay between multiple layers of identity,
in particular, personal identity as derived from interpersonal comparisons and social identity as gained from group
membership (Turner et al., 1987). An often-stated assumption is that individuals with high self-esteem from inter-
personal comparisons have less of a need to engage in group comparisons. Although the details of such correlations
are the subject of considerable debate (see, e.g. Aberson et al., 2000), this sort of reasoning suggests that in-group
bias likely also depends on individual characteristics.
6Next to status, social psychology considers similarity among group members as a second main driver for enhancing
group identity (Tajfel and Turner, 1979). Similarity by itself is, however, not sucient to explain an asymmetry eect.
7See, however, Shayo (2009) and Holm (2016) for models of jurisdictional identication depending on the status
of groups. Tsutsui and Zizzo (2014) and Butler (2014) experimentally manipulate status by only changing the label
of a group. Dierent from us, these studies consider behavior in strategic environments.
8The nature of the tasks used for this purpose diers widely across the literature. See Cheng et al. (2014) for a
review of experimental and survey measures to manipulate status in social psychology research. Some even employ
tests of cognitive ability, as we do (Brewer et al., 1993).
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the relation between in-group bias and status that includes costly decisions.9 Another prominent
question is whether status associations are automatic in the sense that they underlie unconscious
attitudes and beliefs (for recent examples, see Rudman et al., 2002; Newheiser and Olson, 2012).
Compared to this literature, we follow the economic approach and measure bias as revealed
preference rather than a dierence in perceptions. This is of considerable value because individuals
may not perceive groups dierently, may be wrong in their perceptions, and because perceptions
may have no impact on behavior (for a general discussion of these and other concerns with attitu-
dinal measures, see Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001). Moreover, in the absence of real incentives,
the economic prediction is that subjects are indierent, which gives rise to potential concerns that
the results could be artifacts of context and experimenter demand. In line with this, Chen and Li
(2009), as part of a comprehensive study on in-group bias, evaluate common methods to induce
group categorization in social psychology research. They nd that some of the methods commonly
used to induce group categorization signicantly increase attachment to groups as measured from
a questionnaire, but have no eect on behavior.10
There are also conceptual dierences between evaluations and behavior as measures for in-group
bias. To see this, assume that people agree about the status distinction between groups such that
evaluations would not be biased.11 For example, people might agree that high- and low status
groups are not equally deserving. Such beliefs might matter for behavior nonetheless (see the
literature on entitlements below).
Another fundamental dierence is the use of deception. Experimenters in social psychology
often use bogus procedures, such as false feedback about test performance, to manipulate group
status. While this has the advantage of keeping group assignment essentially random, it comes at
the danger of losing experimental control (Ortmann and Hertwig, 2002). We do not use deception
in our design.
Literature on entitlements. Social identity theory is not the only explanation for higher bias in
high-performing groups. An alternative, which has been largely ignored in the literature on in-group
bias, is that the asymmetry eect arises mechanically, from a meritocratic notion of entitlement in
situations in which performance is clustered in groups. An extensive body of research nds that
social perceptions regarding the fairness of relative positions in income and wealth depend on the
9In a follow-up to Mullen et al. (1992), Bettencourt et al. (2001) extend the inclusion criteria for the meta-analysis
to reward allocations, resource allocations, and Tajfels matrices as the dependent variable. None of these are costly
to the decision maker. In a recent study, Hays and Blader (2017) consider the eect of status on dictator giving. In
close proximity to the research in economics on entitlements (see below), high-status dictators give less to low-status
receivers only when status is earned by performance in a task. This study is not about in-group bias, but it conrms
our impression that, in social psychology the eect of status on pro-social behavior is generally largely unexplored.
10Partly in line with this interpretation, research in social psychology nds only a weak relationship between explicit
and implicit (unconscious) measures of group bias (for a discussion see Hewstone et al., 2002).
11For an illustration, see Brauer (2001). This author proposes an innovative design in which subjects evaluate several
out-groups on a range of attribute dimensions. Although the results conrm strong stereotypes among occupational
groups, they provide no proof of a stronger evaluative bias for high-status groups. The reason is that the perceived
dierences are largely consensual between high- and low-status subjects. These ndings contrast with social identity
theory according to which members of low-status (high-status) groups try to positively dierentiate the own group
on dimensions unrelated (related) to status (see Mullen et al., 1992; Bettencourt et al., 2001).
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extent to which individuals are perceived as accountable for dierences in economic performance
(see, Konow, 2000; Fong, 2001; Croson and Konow, 2009; Gill and Stone, 2010; Krawczyk, 2010;
Cappelen et al., 2013; Gill and Stone, 2015; Mollerstrom et al., 2015).12 If individuals acknowledge
entitlements and, at the same time, performance diers across groups, these two assumptions have
the straightforward, but nonetheless surprising, implication that high-performing individuals in
high-performing groups have a greater tendency to favor the in-group over the out-group.
Further evidence in support of the observed asymmetry in terms of entitlements comes from
surveys and experiments pointing to a relationship between performance-related traits and what is
typically termed as a person's (rather than a group's) status or prestige (see Weiss and Fershtman
(1998) and Heetz and Frank (2008) for a thorough discussion of possible meanings of status in
economics, including its function as a signaling device). Ball et al. (2001, p. 161) dene status as
a \ranking in a hierarchy that is socially recognized and typically carries with it the expectations
of entitlements to certain resources." In a series of experiments including dierent games, Ball
et al. (2001), Homan et al. (1994), Homan and Spitzer (1985), and Ball and Eckel (1998) nd
that subjects who earn their role in a game by the investment of eort are viewed as deserving a
greater claim to economic rewards. This result indicates that individuals agree on relative positions
based on productivity-related traits (for an evolutionary explanation, see Henrich and Gil-White,
2001). Such agreement legitimizes an asymmetric relationship according to which low-performing
individuals pay deference to high-performing ones, and a person of high performance expects a
reward. Perhaps surprisingly, this literature has not dealt with implications of status for in- and
out-group behavior.
Further related research. Several additional papers relate to our research. In terms of methods,
our study relates to a recent literature on the role of cognitive ability in economic decision-making
(see, e.g., Burks et al., 2009; Rustichini, 2015). Similar to us, Gill and Prowse (2016) and Proto
et al. (2016) classify subjects as either high- or low-cognitive ability in experiments. Their studies
investigate the role of cognitive skills in repeated strategic interactions. In a similar vein, Hanaki
et al. (2015) show that diversity in cognitive ability increases mispricing in markets. These studies,
however, are not about group bias. Generally, cognitive ability is a major determinant of important
life outcomes (see, e.g. Heckman et al., 2006). The literature in economics has only started to explore
the mechanisms that may underlie this relation. Next to a direct eect that already matters for
individual, non-strategic economic decisions, dierences in cognitive ability play a role through
their eect on the level of strategic sophistication and beliefs.
On a more general note, our study is related to the literature on group identity and social
preferences (see Chen and Li, 2009; Klor and Shayo, 2010; Lindqvist and Ostling, 2013). To our
knowledge, our paper is the rst to discuss the implications of entitlement considerations for in- and
out-group behavior within that eld. In addition, our study is related to the emerging literature
12For an overview of dierent fairness principles, compare e.g. Miller (1999), Konow (2003), Cappelen et al. (2007),
and Nicklisch and Paetzel (2018). Compare Homans (1974) and Selten (1988) for earlier contributions on equity
theory.
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on in-group bias in \real" social groups as opposed to articially assembled \minimal" groups
(see, Hewstone et al., 2002; Bernhard et al., 2006; Fowler and Kam, 2007; Goette et al., 2012;
Cappelen et al., 2013; Schniter and Shields, 2014; Chowdhury et al., 2016). Instead of sorting
subjects into new groups, several recent papers in economics use priming techniques to study social
identity in natural groups (among others, see Benjamin et al., 2010; Mobius et al., 2016). These
studies typically evaluate the priming intervention under stable conditions against a neutral control.
Similar to comparing two conditions A and B in an experiment, as we do, this method circumvents
many diculties and identies the causal impact of identity in heterogeneous social groups (for
a discussion, see Cohn and Marechal, 2016). The results of this literature suggest that there
are important quantitative moderators of in-group bias. Our study complements this literature
by hinting at performance perceptions as an important source of heterogeneity in in-group bias
between naturally occurring real groups.
Finally, we add to a recent literature studying how hierarchical systems are sustained by social
norms and their enforcement (see, Ho et al., 2011; von Essen and Ranehill, 2013; Falk, 2017).
Among others, a dierence between these studies and ours is that they consider dierent dimensions
of status from those that we do.
3. Experiment
The experiment has four stages: a performance stage, a group-assignment stage, and two deci-
sion stages (see Figure 1). The subjects receive instructions separately for each stage (compare the
instructions in the Appendix). At any particular stage, the subjects are not yet informed about
what will happen in the subsequent stage(s).
The performance stage. In this stage, we ask the subjects to answer a series of questions, which
have the format of nonverbal multiple choice questions commonly used in tests of cognitive ability.13
Subjects receive no payment for performance. Therefore, next to cognitive ability the test scores
are likely to reect characteristics associated with eort (Segal, 2012). At the end of this stage, all
subjects receive private feedback on their scores.
Depending on the group assignment (described in detail below in this section), some subjects
additionally learn whether their own score falls in either the upper (high) or lower (low) half of the
distribution of scores in the same session.
The group-assignment stage. We use two methods of assigning subjects to social groups. We
have treatments in which we assign subjects to \performance-based groups," based on their scores
from the performance stage. In particular, we split them by session medians into two groups: the
group that scores \High" and the group that scores \Low" in every session. Subjects in these
treatments are labeled as being of type \Low" or \High."
13We measure cognitive ability in a test used by Putterman et al. (2011) and Kamei et al. (2015). The test uses
questions that are taken from de Sereville and Myers (1994), and are based on Raven's progressive matrices. Each
question oers eight possible answers, only one of which is correct. Subjects are given one minute per question. An
example is provided in the instructions. See the Appendix: Figure B.1.
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Figure 1: Overview and timeline of the experimental design
As a control, we run treatments in which we assign subjects to \minimal groups." We follow
the method proposed by Chen and Li (2009). Accordingly, subjects view ve pairs of paintings.
In each pair, one painting is by Wassily Kandinsky and the other by Paul Klee. Subjects indicate
which painting they prefer in a given pair and subsequently, are split by the median preference of
subjects in the same session. This method divides the subjects into two groups, the \Klee" group
and the \Kandinsky" group.14
Treatments and the rst decision stage. After all subjects were assigned to either the performance-
based or the minimal groups, we further match them into subgroups of three. The matching is
such that, in all subgroups, subjects take one of three roles: (i) an active in-group member who is
the only subject that makes a decision (IA), (ii) a passive in-group member who does not make a
decision (IP ), and (iii) a passive out-group member (O). The group assignment and the manner of
matching subjects into subgroups generates four decision treatments.
Figure 2 illustrates the treatments. Consider rst the minimal-groups treatments in the upper
part of the Figure. In the treatments labeled KleejA and KleejB, there are Klee{Klee{Kandinsky
groups in which the decision makers are of type Klee; likewise, in Kand.jA and Kand.jB, there are
Kandinsky{Kandinsky{Klee groups in which the decision makers are of type Kandinsky (the details
on conditions A and B are explained later in this section). Due to the minimal group paradigm,
decisions should not dier between KleejA and Kand.jA or between KleejB and Kand.jB. Hence,
we regard the decisions from these groups as taken from the same treatments, labeled as MinjA
and MinjB.15
Next, consider the performance-based groups in the lower part of the Figure 2. In these treat-
14Subjects' performance in the cognitive-ability test does not dier between performance-based treatments and
minimal treatments (2 = 15:3961 with p = 0:352). Per design, the test scores dier signicantly between subjects
of type LOW and HIGH (2 = 92:6 with p < 0:001).
15Our results show there is indeed no dierence between the Klee and Kandinsky types of decision makers. See
section 4.
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Figure 2: Overview of treatments, roles, and distributions.
ments, 1/3 of all High-scoring and 1/6 of all Low-scoring subjects of a session are randomly assigned
to High{High{Low groups with a High-scoring subject in the role of the decision maker; the re-
maining subjects (1/6 of all High-scoring and 1/3 of all Low-scoring subjects) are matched to
Low{Low{High groups with a Low-scoring decision maker. In this way, we generate one treatment
in which the decision makers score high in High{High{Low groups (see HighjA and HighjB in the
lower panels of Figure 2), and another treatment in which they score low in Low-Low-High groups
(LowjA and LowjB).
The decision. There is just one decision maker (IA) in every group. The task of the decision
maker is to choose between two earnings distributions, LEFT and RIGHT (compare Figure 2). The
LEFT choice implies that all group members receive the same payo. In condition A, if the active
in-group decision maker (IA) chooses RIGHT, the incomes of IA and the out-group member (O)
increase, and the income of the passive in-group member (IP ) decreases. Therefore, by opting for
LEFT the decision maker makes a costly decision in favor of the in-group member, at the expense of
the out-group member. Figure 2 illustrates this choice for the parameters we use for the experiment
(see panels labeled \Condition A"): if IA chooses LEFT, all three group members earn 20 points; if
this subject chooses RIGHT, IA and O earn 26 points, whereas IP earns 16 points.
16 The decision
16As an example, consider the choice of an employer between two job candidates who dier along two dimensions:
productivity and identity. For employers at the margin of indierence, choosing the in-group candidate would be
costly in terms of productivity dierences and would actively discriminate against the out-group candidate. Lower
productivity is considered by making the distribution LEFT less ecient with respect to the sum of payos (following
the Kaldor{Hicks criterion).
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maker only makes one choice. After that, the rst decision stage is over.
A measure of in-group bias | \Condition A" versus \Condition B". In \Condition A," next to
being biased toward the member of the in-group, subjects might choose LEFT because they prefer
an egalitarian payo distribution irrespective of any in- and out-group considerations. Moreover,
in performance-based groups, decision makers in HighjA and LowjA might dier regarding social
preferences and other unobserved traits, because of selection. To net out these eects, we implement
treatments labeled as \Condition B," which swaps the payos between IP and O (see the respective
panels in Figure 2). For example, between HighjA and HighjB, subjects in the role of IA face
identical decisions in terms of their own payos and the overall distribution of payos among
themselves and others. Therefore, if their decisions were independent of the in- and out-group
dimension, we would observe no systematic dierence between these two conditions. By contrast, if
decisions were biased in favor of the in-group member, we would observe more Left choices in HighjA
than in HighjB. The same argument applies for the dierences between LowjA versus LowjB, and
MinjA versus MinjB. Therefore, the dierence-in-dierence eects provide a measure of in-group
bias for dierent identity groups.17
Decision mode. Subjects are randomly assigned to their roles, given the constraints of the group
assignment stage. The roles are xed for the entire experiment. However, to increase the number
of observations per group, at the time of making the decision, the two in-group members IA and
IP do not yet know which role they are in. These subjects make the decision conditional on being
in the role of IA, and they only learn their actual role at the end of the experiment.
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In-group punishment and the second decision stage. If subjects were concerned about a norm
of loyalty within the group, they would be willing to sacrice money to enforce it (see Harris et al.
(2015) for evidence of group favoritism as a social norm). Moreover, our interest is to observe
whether the strength of a social norm, as measured by norm enforcement, diers across treatments.
To allow for this option, we introduce a second decision stage. This stage is identical to the rst
one, with the exception that subjects in the role of IP can now assign up to 4 deduction points to
subjects in the role of IA. For subjects in the role of IP , sending 1 deduction point costs 1 point in
their own earnings. For those in the role of IA, each punishment point received reduces earnings
by 3 points.
In the second decision stage of the experiment, the two in-group members rst enter their
decision conditional on being in the role of IA and then, before they learn their true roles, they
choose their deduction points conditional on being in the role of IP and on whether IA has chosen
LEFT or RIGHT. At the time of deciding between LEFT and RIGHT, subjects know that their
17A dierent approach to account for selection is used by Ball et al. (2001). In their design, subjects performed
a quiz and were sorted into high-status (\Star") or low-status (\No Star") groups. These groups were actually
formed independently of performance, but the instructions were written in a way that made subjects believe that the
members of the Star group were deserving.
18Note that while asking subjects to put themselves in each other's roles might in itself generate a feeling of group
attachment, we apply the same procedure in all treatments. Therefore, such eects would dierence out across
treatments. See also Brandts and Charness (2011) for a discussion of using the \strategy method" in experimental
economics.
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choice might be punished by their in-group peer.19 After all subjects have completed their choices,
they learn their roles and the respective decisions are implemented.
We only hand out the instructions for the second decision stage at the end of the rst decision
stage. At this point, the subjects do not yet have any information about the decisions and outcomes
of the rst decision stage. It is still possible that decisions change following some systematic pattern
over repeated decisions. However, we are interested in the norm-enforcement behavior of subjects
in the role of IP conditionally on the behavior of subjects in the role of IA. Order eects between
phases are of no relevance to that question.
Discussion of the design. Our interest is to test whether the magnitude of the in-group bias
depends on individual characteristics as well as on how subjects are assigned to groups. In the
treatments with minimal groups, group assignment is orthogonal to performance. This treatment
enables us to explore how subjects of dierent cognitive ability react to being categorized in minimal
groups. Other than that, we expect the in-group bias to be symmetric between the Klee and
Kandinsky types.
For the reasons given in sections 1 and 2, we expect the in-group bias to dier between high-
and low-performing groups. In HighjA, subjects in the role of IA know that they are of type
\High." Hence, subjects who are members of high-performing groups may derive a stronger sense
of self from the favorable group comparison. Moreover, they might consider others, who are of type
\Low," as less deserving. In this case, entitlement considerations would mitigate the dierence
between HighjA and HighjB. The opposite eect should be obtained for decision makers of type
\low" between conditions LowjA and LowjB.
As noted above, our design provides a dierence-in-dierence measure of in-group bias for
dierent performance groups. This method works around issues of selection bias and unknown
third variables that may characterize the decision makers in performance-based groups. A remaining
concern is that the very belief by decision makers in the existence of any criterion that correlates
with performance may aect the results. Consider beliefs about income and gender as two plausible
examples: subjects could believe that individuals who score high in a test of cognitive ability
have higher levels of income and wealth. Similarly, they could hold stereotypical beliefs according
to which men dominate in high-performing groups.20 Given such beliefs, subjects motivated by
outcome-based social preferences supposedly would want to distribute payos from high- to low-
performing subjects because they regard the latter as less wealthy and more in need. Moreover,
existing evidence from gender discrimination experiments shows that there is signicant favoritism
toward the opposite gender (see, Lane, 2016). Both arguments run contrary to our expectation of
19In addition, we ask the out-group members O to state their expectations about how many subjects in the role of
IP would punish IA. We ask: \Out of 10 subjects in the role of IP , how many do you think will send `deduction points'
to IA for choosing LEFT?" and \Out of 10 subjects in the role of IP , how many do you think will send `deduction
points' to IA for choosing RIGHT?" Subjects are paid additional 5 points if they guess either one of these answers
correctly.
20Such beliefs indeed seem warranted, according to empirical studies: see Heckman et al. (2006) on the relationship
between cognitive ability and labor market outcomes, and Croson and Gneezy (2009) for a survey and discussion of
gender dierences in relation to condence in gender-neutral tasks.
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stronger in-group bias in high-performing groups, which suggests that the beliefs argument would
bias the results in the reverse direction.21
With respect to the second decision stage, our main interest is to see whether the punishment
behavior reects any asymmetric pattern of in-group bias across dierent identity groups. By
choosing the materially selsh option (RIGHT), a decision maker inicts a loss on the passive in-
group member in condition A but not in B. Hence, we expect that (i) the in-group members punish
the decision makers more strongly for choosing RIGHT in conditions A than B, and that (ii) this
asymmetry varies by the extent of in-group loyalty across groups.
Payment and number of observations: At the end of the experiment, we calculate subjects'
earnings from both decision stages and pay them at the exchange rate of 1 point = e0.35.
We ran the experiment at the Vienna Center for Experimental Economics in October 2013.
In total, 246 subjects participated in 12 sessions. There were between 18 and 24 subjects in each
session. A session lasted for approximately 1 hour, the average subject earned e15.1, and no
additional show-up fee was paid. Subjects were recruited via ORSEE (Greiner, 2015) and the
experiment was programmed and conducted with z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). Table 1 shows the
number of groups and observations per treatment. Because the design elicits the decisions of both
in-group members IA and IP in the strategy mode, there are two observations per group.
Table 1: Treatments and numbers of observations
Treatment subjects no. of groups
(no. of observations in brackets)
LowjA 42 14 (28)
LowjB 39 13 (26)
HighjA 42 14 (28)
HighjB 39 13 (26)
MinjA 48 16 (32)
MinjB 36 12 (24)
Total 246 82 (164)
Notes. The number of observations is twice the number of groups
because two subjects of the same type in every group make a
decisions conditional on being in the role of IA.
21Babcock et al. (1995), Messick and Sentis (1983), and Rodriguez-Lara and Moreno-Garrido (2012) show that
subjects tend to act on dierent fairness principles in a self-serving manner. Note that this concern is unlikely to
aect our measure of in-group bias; for example, high-performing decision makers who put more weight on a norm
of equity instead of equality because of being self-serving would choose RIGHT in both conditions, A and B.
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4. Results
We nd clear evidence for an in-group-bias over the whole sample. On average over all treat-
ments, 55.68% (49/88) of the subjects chose LEFT in condition A. In contrast, only 28.94% (22/76)
of the subjects chose LEFT in condition B. Accordingly, the average in-group bias amounts to 26.74
percentage points. This dierence is highly signicant (55.68% vs. 28.94%, p = 0:001, 2 test, two
sided).
Next, we rstly focus on whether subjects who score high in performance dier in terms of
in-group bias from subjects who score low. After that, the analysis compares the behavior between
performance-based and minimal groups for both high- and low-performing subjects. Finally, we
analyze the punishment behavior in the second decision phase of the experiment.
4.1. Ingroup-bias and group performance
Figure 3 shows the relative frequency of LEFT choices for the performance-based treatments
in the rst decision phase. First, consider the behavior of low-scoring subjects in the two leftmost
bars: 57.14% (16/28) of low-scoring subjects in the role of IA chose LEFT in treatment LowjA.
While this number indicates a great deal of solidarity with the losing subject of the group, only a
small part of the result can be attributed to in-group bias. In LowjB, 42.31% (11/26) of low-scoring
subjects chose LEFT. Hence, the in-group bias amounts to 14.83 percentage points. This number
is not signicantly dierent from zero (57.14% vs. 42.31%, p = 0:276, 2 test, two sided).
Figure 3: Asymmetry of in-group bias between HIGH and LOW (relative frequency of LEFT choices in the rst
decision phase by treatment; error bars show 95% condence intervals).
The result is dierent for high-scoring subjects. In this case, 67.86% (19/28) of subjects chose
LEFT in treatment HighjA, and only 23.08% (6/26) did so in HighjB (see the two rightmost bars
in Figure 3). Therefore, the in-group bias amounts to 44.78 percentage points, which clearly diers
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from zero (p = 0:001). In comparison to low-scoring subjects, the dierence-in-dierence eect
of 30 percentage points (44:8   14:8) is substantial and very close to the conventional level of
signicance (p = 0:102, compare last row in Table 2). We conclude that the in-group bias is strong
and signicant only for subjects who score high in performance.
In general, subjects' cognitive skills, and therefore their assignment to groups, might not be in-
dependent of social preferences (e.g., Ben-Ner et al., 2004) or other individual traits (e.g., Benjamin
et al., 2013). Remember, however, that by dierencing between conditions A and B, the design
already accounts for this possibility.22 Moreover, pooling the data across conditions A and B, the
frequency of LEFT choices does not dier between high- and low-performing groups (0.46 (High)
vs. 0.5 (Low), p = 0:703); that is, the groups show the same general extent of egalitarian behavior.
This result is in line with Benjamin et al. (2013) who also nd no correlation between cognitive
ability and social preferences. Importantly, this nding already suggests that the asymmetry ef-
fect is unlikely to be a result of selection and unknown variables. The next subsection provides
additional evidence supporting an interpretation of the asymmetry eect as causal.
4.2. In-group bias and individual performance in minimal groups
In the treatments involving minimal groups, 43.75% of 32 subjects in the role of IA chose LEFT
in treatment MinjA, compared to 20.83% of 24 subjects in MinjB. Accordingly, the in-group bias
is 22.9 percentage points for minimal groups. This number is signicantly dierent from zero at
the 10% level (p = 0:073), and lies just between the 14.8 and 44.8 percentage points observed for
real-group treatments. Therefore, we replicate earlier ndings in the literature, according to which
minimal groups already generate in-group bias. Furthermore, there is no asymmetry eect with
assignment based on minimal groups.23
Figure 4 compares the behavior of high-scoring subjects (left panel) and low-scoring subjects
(right panel) between the minimal-group treatments and the respective performance-based treat-
ments.24 The results show that the in-group bias of high-scoring subjects is smaller when the group
assignment is \minimal", compared to \performance-based:" the bias is only 6.8 percentage points
for high-scoring subjects in MinjA and MinjB (see the bars labeled High/MinjA and High/MinjB:
25.00% vs. 18.18%, p = 0:692); by contrast, we have already observed that the in-group bias is
44.8 percentage points for high-scoring subjects in performance-based groups (see the bars labeled
HighjA and HighjB). For low-scoring subjects in minimal groups, the in-group bias is 31.9 percent-
age points (55.00% in Low/MinjA vs. 23.08% in Low/MinjB, p = 0:070); this compares to a bias of
22To illustrate, assume that the average high-scoring subject was more averse to inequality. This would show up
as a dierence in LEFT-choices between treatments HIGH and LOW, but the bias would dierence out between
conditions A and B.
23The in-group bias is 20.8% (37.5%-16.7%) in Kandinsky and 25% (50%-25%) in Klee subgroups; p = 0:266, 2
test, two sided.
24In the minimal group treatments, high-scoring subjects are those who perform above the median of all subjects in
our experiment. Accordingly, there are 23 high-scoring and 33 low-scoring subjects in our minimal group treatments.
Because of randomization, the distribution of types is orthogonal to treatment assignment; p = 0:530, 2 test, two
sided.
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14.8 percentage points in the LOW groups. Figure 4 reveals that most of the dierence between the
behavior of high and low-performing subject in minimal groups happens in condition A (compare
the bars labeled High/MinjA and Low/MinjA): low-performing subjects choose LEFT more often
than high-performing ones (p = 0:098 2 test, two sided). The dierence is slightly dampened in
condition B, but the dierence-in-dierence eect is signicant (p = 0:084, compare the second to
last row in Table 2); this is, in minimal groups the in-group bias tends to be larger for subjects of
type LOW than those of type HIGH.
Figure 4: Frequency of LEFT choices split by treatment and performance (error bars show 95% condence intervals).
Table 2 shows the results of a linear probability model summarizing our results.25 The dependent
variable takes a value of 1 if a subject chose LEFT, and zero otherwise. The regressions are split
by subject type (high and low), they do not include a constant, and are estimated as follows:
LEFTi = b1Min + b2Min  A + c1High + c2High  A + i (see column (1)), and LEFTi =
b1Min+b2MinA+d1Low+d2LowA+i (column (2)), withMin, High, and Low indicating the
respective treatment and A as dummy variable for being in condition A. Accordingly, 18.2% of high-
scoring subjects choose LEFT in the role as member of a minimal group in condition B (see variable
MinjB in column (1)). This number increases by 6.8 percentage points for subjects in minimal group
in condition A (MinjA); that is, 6.8 percentage points is the estimate of the in-group bias among
high-performing subjects in minimal groups. In comparison, column (2) repeats the estimation for
subjects who score low in the test. Here, the estimated in-group bias is 31.9 percentage points in
minimal groups (see MinjA). The dierence-in-dierence eect (6:8 31:9 =  25:1) is quantitatively
25The results are essentially unchanged if we use logistic regressions instead.
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MinjA(1) = MinjA(2) p = 0:084
HighjA(1) = LowjA(2) p = 0:102
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
important and is signicant at the 10 percent level (two-sided, see the row labeled \MinjA(1) =
MinjA(2)"). This result shows that cognitive ability correlates with in-group bias in minimal
groups.
The middle and lower parts of Table 2 replicate the ndings in Figure 3. 23.1% of high-
performing subjects choose LEFT in performance-based groups (see HighjB in column(1)). The
in-group bias is measured as the increase of this number between conditions A and B, and amounts
to 44.8 percentage points (see HighjA). For subjects who score low in performance-based groups, the
in-group bias of 14.8 percent is not dierent from zero (see LowjA in column(2)). The dierences-in-
dierence eect between high- and low-performing groups (44:8 14:8 = +30) is again quantitatively
large; it very nearly signicant at the 10 percent level (two-sided, see the row labeled \HighjA(1)
= LowjA(2)").
To summarize, our results suggest that performance in a test of cognitive ability inuences
the in-group bias at both the individual and the group level. However, the asymmetric in-group
bias between groups strongly dominates and overturns the individual-level dierences in minimal
groups. This result indicates that the asymmetry eect is driven by what subjects know about the
performance of the in-group relative to the out-group. It provides further evidence supporting the
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interpretation of the eect as causal.26
4.3. In-group punishment
The second decision phase is a one-to-one repetition of the rst one with the exception that
subjects in the role of passive in-group member IP can now assign punishment points to the decision
maker IA. Subjects can assign up to 4 deduction points, each at a cost of 1 point for themselves,
conditional on the decision maker choosing either RIGHT or LEFT. We dene PR = f0; 1; 2; 3; 4g
and PL = f0; 1; 2; 3; 4g as the decision to punish the decision RIGHT and LEFT, respectively.
Aggregated over all conditions, 23.2% (38 out of 164) of subjects punish the decision maker for
choosing RIGHT; only 7.3% (12 out of 164) punish IA for choosing LEFT. However, these numbers
dier substantially between treatments. Table 3 shows the distribution of deduction points for each
treatment split up by whether the decision maker has chosen RIGHT or LEFT.
Tmts decision Frequency of punishment
0 p. 1 p. 2 p. 3 p. 4 p. Total p.
MinjA PR 23 2 3 2 2 22
PL 29 1 0 1 1 8
MinjB PR 24 0 0 0 0 0
PL 23 1 0 0 0 1
HighjA PR 19 3 0 0 6 27
PL 27 0 0 0 1 4
HighjB PR 24 1 0 0 1 5
PL 25 0 0 0 1 4
LowjA PR 19 2 2 3 2 23
PL 26 1 1 0 0 3
LowjB PR 17 5 3 1 0 14
PL 22 3 0 1 0 6
Total PR 126 13 8 6 11 91
PL 152 6 1 2 3 26
Table 3: Frequency of punishment per treatment and decision.
Table 3 shows that punishment is asymmetric in three dimensions. First, if we ignore the
subtleties of some treatments for a moment, we observe that punishment is overwhelmingly directed
toward decisions that implement the RIGHT distribution: averaged over all treatments, PR =
0:5549 versus PL = 0:1585, which is signicantly dierent (p < 0:0001). This pattern mirrors the
26In all conditions, the decision makers are informed about their own absolute test scores; in addition, in
performance-based groups, they learn something about their own scores relative to other subjects. It might be
argued that this dierence matters because decision makers are more likely to feel like strong (or weak) subjects.
However, if we pool the data across conditions A and B, high-scoring decision makers are not more egoistic in minimal
groups than in performance-based groups, p = 0:420 (regression-based t-test using LEFT as the dependent variable;
independent variables are treatment (HIGH in comparison to MIN as the left-out category) and a control for the
condition (A vs. B); the reported p-value refers to the estimated coecient of the treatment dummy). Similarly, the
pooled outcomes do not dier between minimal and low-performing groups (p = 0:297). Therefore, the data do not
support the view that this argument is important in our design.
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behavior in phase one. Choosing LEFT is costly to subjects, and therefore an expression of living
up to a social norm. Thus, it might be expected that subjects who choose LEFT themselves are
more likely to punish others for choosing RIGHT, that is, they are more willing to enforce the norm.
In line with this interpretation, the extent and direction of punishment diers strongly between
subjects depending on their choices in the role of IA: PR = 0:9296 for subjects who chose LEFT,
versus PR = 0:2688 for those who chose RIGHT in phase 1 (p = 0:003).
Second, there is substantially more punishment PR in condition A than in B, both in MIN
(p = 0:005) and HIGH (p = 0:026). Punishment for choosing LEFT (PL) is not signicantly
dierent between conditions A and B for MIN, LOW, and HIGH groups (p = 0:436, p = 0:349
and p = 0:958, respectively). The behavior in these treatments is in line with, for example,
the assumptions of Fehr and Schmidt (1999), according to which subjects dislike inequality, but
they dislike unfavorable inequality (in condition A) more than favorable (in condition B).27 If
subjects anticipate the observed asymmetry of punishment between conditions A than B, this
would contribute to further enforcing a norm of in-group loyalty. Our results indicate that such a
mechanism might evolve in treatments MIN and HIGH.28
Third, subjects of type LOW stand out in that they punish their in-group peers for choosing
the materially self-interested option (RIGHT) in condition B as well. In comparison to the other
treatments, variable PR takes a higher value in LOWjB than in MINjB (p = 0:004). Between
LOWjB and HIGHjB, the dierence is less pronounced, but still signicant, based on a one-sided
test (p = 0:070). As a consequence, in groups with members of type LOW, the punishment behavior
does not dier between conditions A and B (p = 0:804).29
In condition A, the punishment of RIGHT (PR) signals a norm against unfavorable treatment
of out-group members. One way to interpret why this behavior diers between treatments is that
once they know that they are low performers, people favor a norm of equality (in low-performing
groups, subjects are punished for not choosing the equal distribution both in LowjA and LowjB);
otherwise, they favor a norm of entitlement (in high-performing groups, subjects are punished for
not choosing the equal distribution in HighjA but not in HighjB). This interpretation ts with
the results of Barr et al. (2015), who show that an individual's tendency to acknowledge earned
entitlement is associated with his or her economic status relative to others. Note that this behavior
is dicult to reconcile with simple inequality aversion. This is indicated, for instance, by the low
27Negative reciprocity would be another reason for punishing the decision maker for choosing RIGHT in condition
A (IP receives a payo of 16 points rather than 20 points). However, it would then be expected that subjects
also punish the decision maker for choosing LEFT in condition B (IP receives a payo of 20 points rather than 26
points); therefore, additional assumptions, like loss aversion, would be needed to rationalize the asymmetric pattern
of punishment between conditions A and B.
28We do not report the choice behavior of phase 2 because it is very similar to phase 1. This nding might of
course change in a design that permits a repeated number of phases with feedback on punishment after each phase.
However, our ndings seem to be in line with a study by Weng and Carlsson (2015), who nd no eect of punishment
on cooperation in teams with strong identity.
29Table A.1 in the Appendix further splits the data by individual performance in minimal groups: Low/MinjA,
Low/MinjB, High/MinjA and High/MinjB. It shows that PR also diers signicantly between Low/MinjB and LowjB
(p = 0:031). This indicates again that the asymmetric punishment pattern is unlikely a result of selection.
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level of punishment PR in the control treatment MinjB, which is 0.
Table 3 suggests that the observed eects predominantly come from reactions at the extensive
margin (whether or not the subjects punish), rather than on the intensive margin (how much they
punish). This impression is formally corroborated by a two-part hurdle model (Cragg, 1971), using
PR as the dependent variable (see, Table 4). The model accounts for the possibility of separating
the decision to punish (selection model) from the decision of how much to punish (outcome model).
We run the regression separately for conditions A and B. The omitted category is Min.
There are no treatment eects on the intensive margin (see the upper pane of Table 4). We
observe signicant eects only at the extensive margin (see lower pane of Table 4). These eects
are in line with the results from above. First, subjects who have chosen LEFT themselves are more
likely to punish the decision maker for choosing RIGHT (coef. 0.838 and 1.141 in condition A and
B, respectively). Second, there is a positive and signicant coecient of Low only in condition B
(coef. 1.510 in condition B), indicating that the decision maker is punished for choosing RIGHT
more likely in treatment Low than in High.30
Remember that subjects in the role of IP enter two punishment decisions, only one of which
is relevant, conditional on whether IA has chosen RIGHT or LEFT. So far, we only considered
PR in the regression, because only a few subjects punish the decision maker for choosing LEFT.
Alternatively, we dene PR L = fPR PL ; 0g if IP punishes RIGHT fmore than, equally to or less
thang LEFT. Table A.2 in the Appendix repeats the hurdle regression for PR L, and the results
are qualitatively the same as in Table 4.
Finally, we asked the subjects in the role of O (the passive out-group members) to state their
expectations about how many subjects in the role of IP would punish IA (see section 1). The
subjects were paid for correct expectations and, other than this, they had no active part in the
experiment. Therefore, expected punishment is an additional and independent source of data for
testing for asymmetric identity norms between treatments. Table A.3 in the Appendix provides
summary statistics and simple non-parametric tests for this data. Similar to before, we dene
P eR = f0; 1; :::; 10g (P eL = f0; 1; :::; 10g) as the expected punishment for choosing RIGHT (LEFT),
and we dene P eR L = fP eR P eL ; 0g if O expects that IP punishes RIGHT fmore than, equally to or
less thang LEFT.31 Aside from the fact that subjects overestimate the actual extent of punishment,
the expectations fully corroborate our ndings from actual punishment behavior. Accordingly, the
subjects expect no dierence in punishment between LowjA and LowjB (p = 0:940); but they do
expect signicant dierences in P eR L both, between MinjA and MinjB (p = 0:017), and between
HighjA and HighjB (p = 0:043) (see, Table A.3 in the Appendix).
30The omitted variable is MinjB. However, subjects happen not to punish in MinjB. Therefore, both HighjB and
MinjB jointly form the omitted category in the regression.
31P eL (P
e
R) are taken from the interval f0; 1; :::; 10g because we ask subjects in the role of O about their expectation
of how many out of 10 subjects in the role of IP will punish LEFT (RIGHT).
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Table 4: Punishment of the decision RIGHT






















Table notes. Hurdle models. Dependent variable: Punish-
ment points PR = f0; 1; 2; 3; 4g. *p  0:1, **p  0:05,***p 
0:01.
4.4. Eciency
In this section, we briey discuss the potential eects of our results on eciency, by looking
at aggregate payo dierences between identity groups. We note that these results are unlikely to
generalize, because they also depend on experimental design. In-group bias is dened in terms of
variance across the in- and out-group dimension. Whether or not the asymmetric in-group bias
translates into dierences in means depends on further factors, such as selection eects (which were
largely absent in our experiment) and the structure of decisions with regard to the consequences
for ones' own and others' payos (which was balanced across conditions in our design).
Total payos are 20 + 20 + 20 = 60 in LEFT and 26 + 26 + 16 = 68 RIGHT. We have already
seen that the behavior averaged over both conditions A and B does not dier between treatments.
Consequently, total payos (as well as the payos per subgroups) do not dier between LOW,
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HIGH and MIN.32 In the second decision stage with punishment, the picture remains essentially
the same. Payos (pooled across conditions and including the cost of punishment) do not dier
between HIGH, LOW, and MIN.33
5. Discussion and conclusion
We studied the role of performance dierences in a task requiring cognitive eort in an ex-
periment on in-group bias. We observe that (i) high-performing subjects exhibit no in-group bias
as members of minimal groups, whereas low-performing subjects strongly do, and that (ii) groups
consisting of subjects who score high show more in-group bias than those who score low.
Our rst nding contributes to a recent literature showing that higher cognitive ability is cor-
related with less biased behavior (e.g., Benjamin et al., 2013). It suggests that the characteristics
of subjects included in the sample are likely to be more important than previously thought in the
literature on in-group bias. The result also helps us understand our second nding, suggesting that
the direction of the asymmetric in-group bias is not simply a result of subjects of dierent ability
reacting dierently to being categorized in arbitrary groups.
The literature oers two conceptual explanations for our second result. One is common in
social psychology and assumes that subjects derive a stronger sense of self from favorable group
comparisons. The other explanation has been largely overlooked in the literature so far, and
rests on a meritocratic notion of entitlements in the context of groups. Both explanations apply
simultaneously, and are notoriously dicult to separate.
The asymmetry eect of performance perceptions between groups implies that members of
low-status groups are less loyal to other members of their group. In terms of welfare, there are
situations in which this kind of behavior could have large negative eects. For example, Gill
and Stone (2015) show that entitlement considerations can mitigate the negative incentive eects
within teams. Consequently, a lack of group loyalty might negatively aect cooperation incentives
in low-performing groups.34
On the other hand, group loyalty is not always desirable. To illustrate this, consider the
parameters we implemented in our experiment. In the conditions involving tension between group
loyalty and self-interest, behavior that favors the in-group member decreases the overall sum of
payments. This eect holds because, alongside avoiding negative consequences for the in-group
member, the group-loyal choice is worse for the out-group member. In-group loyalty might therefore
be important in perpetuating social inequality, for example when it gives rise to group conict or
when it hinders skills being used optimally owing to out-group discrimination (see Chowdhury
32In the rst decision stage without punishment, the average payos are 21.71, 21.09, and 21.19 in MIN, HIGH,
and LOW, respectively; p-values from a 2-test (two-sided) are as follows: LOW vs. HIGH p = 0:878, LOW vs. MIN
p = 0:427, and HIGH vs. MIN p = 0:344.
33The average payos are 21.5, 20.59, and 20.67 in MIN, HIGH, and LOW, respectively: LOW vs. HIGH p = 0:975,
LOW vs. MIN p = 0:171, and HIGH vs. MIN p = 0:214.
34Similarly, research in social psychology argues that the lack of group identity might have a negative eect on
work motivation and performance. See van Knippenberg and Ellemers (2003)
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et al., 2016; Bandiera et al., 2009). Another example in which group loyalty leads to bad outcomes
is given by Hadnes et al. (2013). In a study of entrepreneurial activity in Africa, these authors
show that group-sharing norms lead to substantial ineciencies because they reduce individual
incentives to provide eort.
Economic success often is correlated with the ability and willingness to exert eort, for example,
in high-quality jobs. From this perspective, our ndings shed new light on elite behavior. Sokolo
and Engerman (2000), Acemoglu et al. (2005), and Glaeser et al. (2003) highlight the importance
of elite behavior for the development of countries. As pointed out by Paetzel and Traub (2017)
and Co^te et al. (2015), elite behavior depends crucially on the social distance between the elite and
the remaining society. Paetzel and Traub (2017) formalize this idea in a skewness-adjusted social
preference functional and provide some experimental evidence, whereas, Co^te et al. (2015) provide
macro-empirical evidence. Our ndings suggest that social distance may depend on perceived
performance and explain why high-performing groups (elites) discriminate against low-performing
out-groups.
The reasons that groups are economically segregated are, of course, manifold. One of those
reasons, which we did not consider in our design, is homophily (Currarini et al., 2009), which means
that people tend to form groups with others who are similar. Further research may clarify whether
the factors that lead to the formation of natural groups would mitigate or enhance the asymmetry
eect. Based on the results of our experiment, it could be surmised that groups are equally biased
as long as the group assignment is perceived to be caused by factors beyond individual control.
On the other hand, a belief that the characteristics of the groups are determined by the eort
of its members would suce to generate the eects we describe in the experiment. Furthermore,
psychological research provides evidence that subjective performance perceptions tend to be biased.
On the one hand, successful people often downplay the role of luck as a reason for success | a
phenomenon known as \illusion of control" (Langer, 1975). On the other hand, members of socially
disfavored groups often perceive themselves as less than deserving | a phenomenon sometimes
referred to as \system justication" (see Major, 1994; Jost, 2001). Such phenomena would further
enforce the phenomenon we observed in our experiment.
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Appendix A. Tables
Tmts decision Frequency of punishment
0 p. 1 p. 2 p. 3 p. 4 p. Total p.
HighjA PR 19 3 0 0 6 27
PL 27 0 0 0 1 4
HighjB PR 24 1 0 0 1 5
PL 25 0 0 0 1 4
LowjA PR 19 2 2 3 2 23
PL 26 1 1 0 0 3
LowjB PR 17 5 3 1 0 14
PL 22 3 0 1 0 6
MinjA PR 23 2 3 2 2 22
PL 29 1 0 1 1 8
MinjB PR 24 0 0 0 0 0
PL 23 1 0 0 0 1
Low/MinjA PR 13 2 3 1 1 15
PL 17 1 0 1 1 8
Low/MinjB PR 13 0 0 0 0 0
PL 13 0 0 0 0 0
High/MinjA PR 10 0 0 1 1 7
PL 12 0 0 0 0 0
High/MinjB PR 11 0 0 0 0 0
PL 10 1 0 0 0 0
Table A.1: Frequency of punishment per treatment and decision.
1
Table A.2: Punishing RIGHT more than LEFT





















Table notes. Hurdle models. Dependent vari-
able: Punishing RIGHT more than LEFT in
points [0; 1; 2; 3; 4]. *p  0:1, **p  0:05,***p 
0:01.
2
Table A.3: Expectations of subjects in role O regarding IP 's punishment
MinjA (N = 16) MinjB (N = 12)
P eR L = 4:063 P
e
R L = 1:75 p = 0:017
LowjA (N = 14) LowjB (N = 13)
P eR L = 2:714 P
e
R L = 2:462 p = 0:940
HighjA (N = 14) HighjB (N = 13)
P eR L = 4:429 P
e
R L = 2:308 p = 0:043
Notes: Expectations of subjects in role O regarding IP 's punish-
ment: P eR L = fP eR   P eL ; 0g if O expects that IP punishes IA
fmore than, equally to or less thang for choosing RIGHT than
LEFT. P eR = f0; 1; :::; 9; 10g (P eL = f0; 1; :::; 9; 10g) is dened as
the expected punishment for choosing RIGHT (LEFT). p-values in




Instructions - part one
Welcome to the experiment. If you read the instructions carefully and follow the rules, you
will have the opportunity to earn money. You will receive your payment in cash at the end of the
experiment.In the experiment, we do not talk of Euros. Instead, all your payments are calculated
in experimental points. The value of points is given by the following exchange rate:
1 point = 0,35 Euro.
During the experiment you are not allowed to speak to other participants. If you have any questions,
please ask us, and we will answer your question in private. It is very important that you follow
these rules. Otherwise, the results of this experiment have no value from a scientic perspective.
The experiment consists of three parts; every part is explained separately. The experiment
will last approximately 60 minutes. We now explain the rst part of the experiment.
Detailed information on the rst part of the experiment
The rst part of the experiment consists of one task [two tasks in the MIN treatments], which
are described as follows.
Task 1: You will observe 15 screens. On every screen you face a task. We ask you to solve as
many tasks correctly as possible. There will be a time limit of 60 seconds per screen, otherwise the
task counts as unsolved. At the end, you will be informed about how many tasks you have solved
correctly. You will not receive any money for solving the tasks; nonetheless, we ask you to take
this part seriously and try to solve as many tasks correctly as possible.
Task 2: [This task is shown only to participants in the MIN treatments] In the following, you
will observe six screens in succession. On every screen, you will observe two paintings next to each
other. One of the two paintings (you do not know which one) is always from Wassily Kandinsky
and the other one is from Paul Klee. Your task is to indicate on each screen, which of the two
paintings you like better.
Based on your decisions in task 2, you will be assigned a type.
 If you prefer the pictures by Kandinsky, the type KANDINSKY is assigned to you.
 If you prefer the pictures by Klee, the type KLEE is assigned to you.
4
Figure B.1: Sample Screen IQ-test
Note: Sample screen from the IQ-test. Participants have to nd the correct symbol.
At the end of the rst part, you will get to know whether you have been assigned type KANDIN-
SKY or KLEE.
If you still have any questions, please raise your hand and wait quietly until one of
the experimenters attends to you.
[The following feedback is provided to subjects at the end of the performance stage:]
Your score of correctly answered questions: Number]
[The following information was only shown to participants in MIN treatments]
Based on your decisions, you are assigned into the group of participants preferring the following
artist: [KLEE or KANDINSKY]
[The following information was only shown to participants in LOW and HIGH treatments ]
In this experiment, the participants are split into two groups of equal size based on their scores of
correctly answered questions.
5
 If you belong to the group of participants who correctly answered many questions relative to
all participants you will be assigned type HIGH.
 If you belong to the group of the participants who correctly answered few questions relative
to all participants you will be assigned type LOW.
Based on your relative performance in the task, you are assigned the following type: [LOW or
HIGH]
Instructions | part two
You are now in the second part of the experiment. In this part, you and two other participants
will form a group of three subjects. We call the participants in your group participants 1,2, and
3. Your role, regardsless whether you are participant 1, 2, or 3, is already determined and remains
the same during the whole experiment. You will learn later in the experiment which role you are in.
Decision of participant 2
In this part of the experiment, only participant 2 will take a decision; participants 1 and 3 do not
take decisions.
Consequences of the decision of participant 2
Participant 2 decides between two options. This decision has an impact on all participants in the
group. The following Table B.4 shows the payment of participants 1, 2, and 3, depending on the
decision of participant 2. If participant 2 decides on choosing LEFT (see left column), then all
participants in the group receive 20 points. If participant 2 decides on RIGHT (see right column),
then he or she receives 26 points, participant 1 receives 16 points, and participant 3 receives 26
points.
Table B.4: Payo of participants depending on the decision of participant 2
Participant 2 Participant 2
chooses left chooses right
Participant 1 20 16
Participant 2 20 26
Participant 3 20 26
You will now see a decision screen on which participant 2 has to decide between LEFT and
RIGHT. [Between conditions A and B, the payos of participant 1 and 3 were swopped.]
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[Subjects are informed about their type (Kandinsky or Klee in minimal groups, and LOW or
HIGH in performance-based groups)]
[Before they go to the decision screen, the two subjects who share the same type within the group
are instructed on the screen about the decision mode:]
So far, you do not know whether you are in the role of participant 1 or 2. You will be informed
about your actual role (participant 1 or participant 2) at the end of the experiment after you
have reached a decision. To determine the payos, only the decision of the role of participant 2
is relevant. If you are in the role of participant 1, your decision does not aect the payos in the
experiment.
Figure B.2: Decision Screen.
Note: Sample screen from MIN treatment. In LOW and HIGH treatments, everything was exactly the
same, but instead of KANDINSKY and KLEE, LOW and HIGH were shown to the participants.
Instructions | part three
Your payment of the second part is already determined and you will be informed about that payo
at the end of the experiment. Now, you receive the instructions of the third part of the
experiment:
You are now in the third part of the experiment. This part is identical to the second part of the
experiment, with the only dierence being that now, participant 1 also takes a decision. In this
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part you are in the same group and in the same role as in the second part.
Decision of participant 2: The decision of participant 2 is identical to the decision in the second
part of this experiment.
Decision of participant 1: Participant 1 has the opportunity to send \deduction points" to
participant 2. Sending a deduction point is costly for participant 1 and receiving a deduction point
is also costly for participant 2:
 For every deduction point that participant 1 sends to participant 2, participant 1 loses 1
point;
 For every deduction point that participant 2 receives from participant 1, participant 2 loses
3 points.
Participant 1 can send 4 deduction points at most.
 Example 1: Assume that participant 1 sends 3 deduction points. In this case, the payo of
participant 1 decreases by 3 points and the payo of participant 2 decreases by 9 points (3 x
3 deduction points).
 Example 2: Assume that participant 1 sends no deduction point. In this case the payments
of participants 1 and 2 remain unchanged.
In the following, you will observe a decision screen on which those in the role of participant 2 decide
between LEFT and RIGHT. After that, another screen appears on which those in the role of par-
ticipant 1 decide how many deduction points they want to send to those in the role of participant 2.
[Depending on the treatments, subjects have the label [Kandinsky or Klee in MIN and LOW or
HIGH in treatments LOW and HIGH] and are assigned into treatment specic groups.]
After the third part, the experiment is over and you receive your payment in cash. If
you have any questions, raise your hand and wait quietly until one of the experimenters
attends to you.
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Appendix C. Instructions in German
Instruktionen Teil 1
Willkommen zum Experiment. Wenn Sie die Instruktionen aufmerksam lesen und alle Regeln
beachten, konnen Sie in diesem Experiment Geld verdienen. Das Geld wird im Anschluss sofort
in bar an Sie ausbezahlt. Wahrend des Experimentes sprechen wir nicht von Euro sondern von
Punkten. Diese werden gema folgendem Wechselkurs umgerechnet:
1 Punkte = 0,35 Euro.
Wahrend des gesamten Experiments ist das Sprechen mit anderen Teilnehmern nicht erlaubt. Wenn
Sie Fragen haben, richten Sie diese bitte ausschlielich an uns. Wir beantworten Ihre Fragen gerne
individuell. Die Einhaltung dieser Regel ist sehr wichtig. Andernfalls sind die Ergebnisse dieses
Experimentes wissenschaftlich wertlos.
Dieses Experiment besteht aus 3 Teilen, wobei jeder einzelne Teil nacheinander einzeln erlautert
wird. Das Experiment wird voraussichtlich 60 Minuten dauern. Im Folgenden wird Ihnen nun der
erste Teil des Experimentes erlautert.
Detaillierte Informationen zum 1. Teil des Experiments
Der erste Teil des Experimentes besteht aus einer Aufgabe [zwei Aufgaben in den MIN treatments],
welche im Folgenden beschrieben werden.
Aufgabe 1: Sie werden hintereinander 15 Bildschirme sehen. Auf jedem Bildschirm sehen Sie eine
Aufgabe. Wir bitten Sie, so viele Aufgaben wie moglich richtig zu losen. Sie haben fur die Losung
einer Aufgabe maximal 60 Sekunden Zeit. Andernfalls gilt die Aufgabe als nicht gelost. Am Ende
des ersten Teiles erfahren Sie wie viele Aufgaben Sie richtig gelost haben. Sie erhalten kein Geld
fur das Losen der Aufgaben: wir bitten Sie aber dennoch die Aufgaben ernst zu nehmen und so
gut Sie konnen zu losen.
Aufgabe 2: [Diese Aufgabe sehen nur die Teilnehmer in den MIN treatments] Im Folgenden wer-
den Sie hintereinander sechs Bildschirme sehen. Auf jedem Bildschirm sehen Sie zwei Gemalde
nebeneinander. Eines der beiden Gemalde (Sie wissen nicht welches) ist dabei immer von Wassily
Kandinsky und das andere von Paul Klee. Ihre Aufgabe besteht nun darin, auf jedem Bildschirm
anzugeben, welches der beiden Gemalde Ihnen besser gefallt. Entscheiden Sie einfach nach Ihrem
Geschmack.
Auf Basis Ihrer Entscheidungen werden Sie dann einem Typ zugeordnet.
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Figure C.1: Beispielbildschirm IQ-Test
Note: Beispielbildschirm IQ-Test. Teilnehmer mussen das passende Symbol nden.
 Wenn Ihnen die Bilder von Kandinsky relativ besser gefallen, wird Ihnen der Typ KANDIN-
SKY zugeordnet.
 Wenn Ihnen die Bilder von Klee relativ besser gefallen, wird Ihnen der Typ KLEE zugeordnet.
Am Ende des 1. Teils des Experimentes werden Sie erfahren, ob Sie vom Typ KLEE oder KANDIN-
SKY sind.
Falls Sie nun noch Fragen haben, heben Sie die Hand und warten Sie ruhig, bis
jemand zu Ihnen kommt.
[Die folgende Information wurde den Teilnehmern nach dem Leistungstest angezeigt:]
Ihre Anzahl an richtig gelosten Aufgaben]
[Die folgende Information wurde nur den Teilnehmern in den MIN treatments angezeigt.]
Basierend auf Ihren Entscheidungen, wurden Sie in die Gruppe der Teilnehmer zugeteilt, die fol-
genden Maler bevorzugen: [KLEE or KANDINSKY]
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[Die folgende Information wurde nur den Teilnehmern in den LOW und HIGH treatments angezeigt]
In diesem Experiment werden die Teilnehmer anhand der richtig beantworteten Fragen in zwei gleich
groe Gruppen einsortiert.
 Wenn Sie zur Halfte der Teilnehmer gehoren, die vergleichsweise viele Fragen richtig beant-
wortet hat, wird Ihnen der Typ HIGH zugeordnet.
 Wenn Sie zur Halfte der Teilnehmer gehoren, die vergleichsweise wenig Fragen richtig beant-
wortet hat, wird Ihnen der Typ LOW zugeordnet.
Durch Ihr relatives Abschneiden im Wissenstest wird Ihnen der folgende Typ zugeordnet: [LOW
oder HIGH]
Instruktionen | Teil 2
Sie benden sich nun im 2. Teil des Experimentes. In diesem Teil des Experimentes bilden Sie
gemeinsam mit zwei anderen Teilnehmern eine 3er-Gruppe. Wir nennen die Teilnehmer in Ihrer
Gruppe Teilnehmer 1, 2, und 3. Ihre Rolle (das heisst, ob Sie Teilnehmer 1, 2, oder 3 sind) steht
bereits fest und bleibt wahrend des gesamten Experiments unverandert. Sie erfahren Ihre Rolle
jedoch erst spater.
Entscheidung des Teilnehmers 2:
In diesem Teil des Experiments trit ausschlielich Teilnehmer 2 eine Entscheidung; die Teilnehmer
1 und 3 treen keine Entscheidung.
Auswirkung der Entscheidung des Teilnehmers 2
Teilnehmer 2 entscheidet zwischen zwei Alternativen. Diese Entscheidung hat Auswirkungen auf
alle Teilnehmer in der Gruppe. Die folgende Tabelle C.5 zeigt die Auszahlungen der Teilnehmer
1, 2 und 3 in Abhangigkeit der Entscheidung von Teilnehmer 2. Entscheidet sich Teilnehmer 2 fur
\Links" (siehe linke Spalte) erhalten alle Teilnehmer in der Gruppe 20 Punkte. Entscheidet sich
Teilnehmer 2 fur \Rechts" (siehe rechte Spalte) erhalt er oder sie 26 Punkte, Teilnehmer 1 erhalt
16 Punkte und Teilnehmer 3 erhalt 26 Punkte.
In Kurze erscheint ein Bildschirm am Computer, auf dem sich der Teilnehmer in der Rolle des Teil-
nehmers 2 zwischen \Links" und \Rechts" entscheidet. [Die Situationen A und B unterscheiden
sich dahingehend, dass die Auszahlungen fur Teilnehmer 1 und 3 vertauscht sind.]
[Teilnehmer werden informiert welcher Typ (KLEE oder KANDINSKY in MIN treatments oder
HIGH und LOW in den HIGH, LOW treatments) Ihnen zugeordnet wurde]
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Table C.5: Auszahlungen der Teilnehmer in Abhangigkeit der Entscheidung von Teilnehmer 2
Teilnehmer 2 Teilnehmer 2
entscheidet sich entscheidet sich
fur Links fur Rechts
Teilnehmer 1 20 16
Teilnehmer 2 20 26
Teilnehmer 3 20 26
[Bevor die Teilnehmer 1 und 2 den Entscheidungsbildschirm sehen, werden Sie uber das Entschei-
dungsverfahren [Strategiemethode] informiert:]
Noch wissen Sie nicht, ob Sie in der Rolle des Teilnehmers 1 oder 2 sind. Erst am Ende des
Experimentes, nachdem Sie Ihre Entscheidung getroen haben, werden Sie erfahren, in welcher
Rolle (Teilnehmer 1 oder Teilnehmer 2) Sie tatsachlich sind. Fur die Auszahlungen relevant ist nur
die Entscheidung des Teilnehmers 2. Wenn Sie in der Rolle des Teilnehmers 1 sind, so hat Ihre
Entscheidung keinen Einuss.
Figure C.2: Decision Screen.
Note: Sample screen from MIN treatment. In LOW and HIGH treatments, everything was exactly the
same, but instead of KANDINSKY and KLEE, LOW and HIGH were shown to the participants.
Instruktionen | Teil 3
Ihre Auszahlung aus dem zweiten Teil des Experimentes steht fest und wird Ihnen am Ende des Ex-
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periments mitgeteilt. Sie erhalten nun die Instruktionen zum dritten Teil des Experimentes:
Sie benden sich nun im 3. Teil des Experimentes. Dieser Teil ist identisch mit dem 2. Teil des
Experimentes, mit der einzigen Ausnahme, dass nun auch Teilnehmer 1 eine Entscheidung trit.
Sie sind in diesem Teil des Experimentes in derselben 3er-Gruppe und in derselben Rolle wie zuvor.
Entscheidung des Teilnehmers 2 Die Entscheidung des Teilnehmers 2 ist identisch mit jener
im 2. Teil des Experiments.
Entscheidung des Teilnehmers 1 Teilnehmer 1 hat die Moglichkeit, Teilnehmer 2 sogenannte
\Abzugspunkte" zu senden. Ein Abzugspunkt kostet sowohl fur Teilnehmer 1 als auch fur Teil-
nehmer 2 Geld:
 fur jeden Abzugspunkt, den Teilnehmer 1 an Teilnehmer 2 sendet, verliert Teilnehmer 1 einen
Auszahlungspunkt;
 fur jeden Abzugspunkt, den Teilnehmer 2 von Teilnehmer 1 empfangt, verliert Teilnehmer 2
drei Auszahlungspunkte.
Teilnehmer 1 kann hochstens 4 Abzugspunkte senden.
 Beispiel 1: Angenommen Teilnehmer 1 sendet drei Abzugspunkte. In diesem Fall reduziert
sich die Auszahlung von Teilnehmer 1 um drei Punkte und jene des Teilnehmers 2 reduziert
sich um neun Punkte (dreimal drei Abzugspunkte)..
 Beispiel 2: Angenommen Teilnehmer 1 sendet keine Abzugspunkte. In diesem Fall bleiben
die Auszahlungen von Teilnehmer 1 und 2 unverandert.
In Kurze erscheint wieder ein Bildschirm am Computer, auf dem sich die Teilnehmer in der Rolle
des Teilnehmers 2 zwischen \Links" und \Rechts" entscheiden. Zudem erscheint ein weiterer
Bildschirm, auf dem sich die Teilnehmer in der Rolle des Teilnehmers 1 entscheiden, wie viele
Abzugspunkte sie an Teilnehmer 2 senden wollen.
[Abhangig vom Treatment haben die Teilnehmer entweder die Typen KLEE und KANDINSKY oder
HIGH und LOW erhalten und sind spezisch nach Treatment in die entsprechende Gruppe einge-
ordnet worden.]
Nach diesem dritten Teil ist das Experiment zu Ende und Sie erhalten Ihre
Auszahlung. Falls Sie nun noch Fragen haben, heben Sie die Hand und warten Sie
ruhig, bis jemand zu Ihnen kommt.
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